Skip to main content

In This Volume

  • 97 (1) For the purposes of giving effect to a division of property or family debt under this Part or Part 6, the Supreme Court may
  • (a) determine any matter respecting the ownership, right of possession, or division of the property or family debt, and
  • (b) despite sections 94(2) and 215(2), and subject to subsection (3) of this section, make any order that is necessary, reasonable or ancillary to give effect to the division.
  • (2) Without limiting subsection (1), the Supreme Court may make an order to do one or more of the following:
  • (a) declare who has ownership of, or right of possession to, property;
  • (b) require that title to a specified property granted to a spouse be transferred to, held in trust for, or vested in the spouse, absolutely, for life or for a term of years;
  • (c) require a spouse to pay compensation to the other spouse if property has been disposed of, transferred, converted, or exchanged into another form, or for the purpose of dividing the property;
  • (d) require partition or sale of property and payment to be made out of the proceeds of sale to one spouse or both in specified proportions or amounts;
  • (e) require property forming all or a part of the share of either or both spouses to be transferred to, held in trust for, or vested in a child;
  • (f) require a spouse to give security, in any form the court directs, for the performance of an obligation imposed by an order under this section, including a charge on property;
  • (g) require a spouse to waive or release in writing any right, benefit or protection given by section 23 of the Chattel Mortgage Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 48, section 19 of the Sale of Goods on Condition Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 373, or section 58 or 67 of the Personal Property Security Act;
  • (h) subject to subsection (3), declare that one spouse is responsible for payment of an item of family debt and must indemnify the other spouse for the item of family debt;
  • (i) require the sale of property for the purposes of paying an item of family debt;
  • (j) transfer property to a spouse.
  • (3) An order in relation to family debt applies only as between the spouses and does not affect an agreement between a spouse and any other person.
  • (4) Nothing in this section permits the Supreme Court to divide excluded property unless permitted under section 96.

2011-25-97, effective March 18, 2013 (B.C. Reg. 131/2012).


Registration of Orders under Section 97

The registrar may change title to the land or to a charge on land if an order under s. 97 contains clear words of present vesting. The registrar is of the opinion that the language in s. 97(2)(f), for a charge on property, will be in the form of a direction to the spouse to give security by granting a charge on property and not the court creating a charge on the property through the court order.


On the Form 17 Fee Simple or, where applicable, the Form 17 Charge, Notation or Filing, select Nature of Interest, Vesting by Court Order, and attach an image of the court certified copy of the court order.


Registration of Indefeasible Title by Court Order

See s. 34 of the Land Title Act.

See Di Castri, Registration of Title to Land, vol. 1, paras. 260 and 319, and vol. 3, para. 967.


The following case was decided under s. 65 of the Family Relations Act (repealed S.B.C. 2011, c. 25, s. 259).

Although the court can order that encumbrances on family assets be discharged out of the assets of the spouses, it cannot order that a holder of a registered charge divest itself of its interest. Consequently, a judgment for legal fees registered against the one-half interest of the applicant’s spouse in the matrimonial home prior to a consent order transferring the spouse’s interest to the applicant could not be cancelled upon application to the court under s. 229 of the Land Title Act. A lis pendens had not been filed before the registration of the judgment, but a lis pendens would not have had any significance given that the spouse’s interest was being transferred rather than reapportioned under s. 65 of the Family Relations Act. Furthermore, a mutual restraining order that restrained and enjoined the parties from further encumbering the property did not invalidate the subsequent registration of the judgment since the order applied only to the parties, not the judgment debtor (Domirti v. Domirti, 1996 CanLII 1619 (BC SC)).